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Flashbacks are a deﬁning feature of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but there have been few studies
of their neural basis. We tested predictions from a dual representation model of PTSD that, compared
with ordinary episodic memories of the same traumatic event, ﬂashbacks would be associated with activ-
ity in dorsal visual stream and related areas rather than in the medial temporal lobe. Participants with
PTSD, with depression but not PTSD, and healthy controls were scanned during a recognition task with
personally relevant stimuli. The contrast of ﬂashbacks versus ordinary episodic trauma memories in PTSD
was associated with increased activation in sensory and motor areas including the insula, precentral
gyrus, supplementary motor area, and mid-occipital cortex. The same contrast was associated with
decreased activation in the midbrain, parahippocampal gyrus, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex.
The results were discussed in terms of theories of PTSD and dual-process models of recognition.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has frequently been char-
acterized as a disorder of memory (Brewin, 2011; van der Kolk,
1996). PTSD patients typically experience ﬂashbacks, involuntary
sensory images of the traumatic scene. These images are vivid, de-
tailed, and lack temporal context, being re-experienced as though
they were happening in the present (Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin,
2007). Flashbacks co-exist with ordinary episodic memories of
the trauma that can be deliberately retrieved and communicated.
The dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001; Brewin,
Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) makes an unusual prediction that, de-
spite ﬂashbacks being extremely vivid, they should involve less
rather than more medial temporal lobe (MTL) activity. We carried
out a preliminary test of this hypothesis by contrasting neural re-
sponses to stimuli eliciting either ﬂashbacks or ordinary episodic
memories of the same traumatic event in PTSD patients.
Previous research on the functional neuroanatomy of voluntary
autobiographical memory has identiﬁed a core network of pre-
dominantly left-lateralized regions including the prefrontal cortex,
MTL (in particular the hippocampus), and posterior cingulate (Svo-tional & Health Psychology,
E 6BT, UK. Fax: +44 207 916
 license.boda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Emotional memories, in contrast,
are associated with bilateral activation and engage additional areas
such as the amygdala and insula (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Svo-
boda et al., 2006). Emotion is thought to enhance recollection, and
increased recollective qualities such as level of detail, personal sig-
niﬁcance, and emotionality have been found to be accompanied by
increased MTL and hippocampal activity (Addis, Moscovitch, Craw-
ley, & McAndrews, 2004; Svoboda & Levine, 2009; Wais, 2008).
Research on healthy participants therefore suggests that partic-
ularly detailed and emotional memories should be accompanied by
high levels of activation in networks including hippocampal and
parahippocampal regions. In contrast, the dual representation the-
ory of PTSD distinguishes normal episodic memories, supported by
ﬂexible, contextualised representations, from ﬂashbacks, sup-
ported by representations that are inﬂexible and lacking in context
(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). Although there is no
formal deﬁnition of a ﬂashback, they are commonly thought to in-
volve an intense sensory and emotional re-experiencing of the
traumatic event that exists on a continuum, ranging from complete
loss of awareness of surroundings to a milder experience of reliv-
ing in the present (Brewin, 2011). This continuum view is part of
the deﬁnition proposed for the upcoming ﬁfth revision of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual (DSM-V) (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011).
In the context of a basically intact episodic memory system, (vi-
sual) ﬂashbacks are hypothesized by Brewin et al. (2010) to reﬂect
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visual stream, extending from posterior visual to superior parietal
regions, that processes egocentric (i.e., own viewpoint), sensation-
near representations of experience designed to facilitate action.
These dorsal visual stream representations (sensation-based repre-
sentations or S-reps) of the trauma are thought to be strongly asso-
ciated with activity in motor cortex reﬂecting defensive actions as
well as with activity in the insula and amygdala reﬂecting emo-
tional and body state responses. Activity in the dorsal stream and
its projections is hypothesized to take precedence over activity in
the ventral visual stream, including inferior and middle temporal
regions, that ordinarily enables scenes to be visualized allocentri-
cally (i.e., from alternative viewpoints), and provides memories
with their context (contextual representations or C-reps).
Most previous neuroimaging studies of PTSD have employed
the script-driven imagery paradigm, in which participants simulta-
neously recall and imagine a traumatic event, a process which typ-
ically elicits additional involuntary trauma memories (Hopper,
Frewen, Sack, Lanius, & van der Kolk, 2007). A case study was re-
ported (Liberzon, Taylor, Fig, & Koeppe, 1996) in which a Vietnam
veteran experienced a ﬂashback during the perfusion phase of a
SPECT scan. Relative to his own baseline, and to that of a PTSD sam-
ple who did not experience ﬂashbacks, he exhibited decreases in
blood ﬂow to a wide range of cortical and subcortical regions. More
recently subjective ﬂashback intensity was correlated with rCBF in
eleven PTSD patients (Osuch et al., 2001). They observed ﬂashback-
related increases in left inferior frontal cortex and bilateral insula,
and ﬂashback-related decreases in right medial temporal, right
fusiform, and bilateral superior frontal cortices. Increased ﬂash-
back reports in PTSD patients have also been found to be correlated
with reduced brain volume in the left insula/parietal operculum
and in the right inferior temporal gyrus (Kroes, Whalley, Rugg, &
Brewin, 2011).
What are so far lacking are studies that directly compare ﬂash-
backs with ordinary episodic memories of the same traumatic
event. In this study PTSD patients wrote a narrative account of
their traumatic event, and identiﬁed which sections were and were
not accompanied by ﬂashbacks (Hellawell & Brewin, 2002, 2004).
We subsequently presented them with words and phrases from
these ﬂashback and episodic memory sections mixed with stimuli
from another narrative. In order to determine which patterns of
observed activity were unique to PTSD, we employed control
groups of depressed patients and healthy controls who had experi-
enced a traumatic event. We predicted that recognition of own ver-
sus other stimuli should show common effects across groups in
previously identiﬁed areas, reﬂecting an intact episodic memory
system. We also predicted that the ﬂashback-episodic trauma
memory contrast would not show common across-group effects.
Rather, the occurrence of ﬂashbacks in PTSD patients would be dis-
tinguished by increased activity in dorsal stream and related areas
such as motor cortex, insula, and amygdala, and by decreased ven-
tral stream activity, for example in inferior and middle temporal
areas.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were 39 right-handed individuals without a history
of head injury, neurological disorders, or other major medical con-
ditions, assessed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (First, Williams, & Spitzer, 1997). Ten patients met DSM-IV cri-
teria for current PTSD (PTSD group). Fifteen participants had expe-
rienced traumatic events similar in magnitude to the PTSD group,
but had not developed PTSD (trauma-exposed Control group).Fourteen patients meeting DSM-IV criteria for current major
depression but not PTSD were also tested (depressed group). Pa-
tients in the PTSD and control groups had experienced a range of
traumas, including involvement in the July 7th 2005 London
bombings and other terrorist attacks (PTSD = 2; control = 7), road
trafﬁc accidents (PTSD = 1; control = 3), interpersonal violence
(PTSD = 5; control = 3), the 2004 Asian tsunami (PTSD = 2; con-
trol = 1). Time since index trauma ranged from 2 months to
24 years, with a median of 2 years. Depressed patients had experi-
enced a range of severe negative life events including some meet-
ing PTSD Criterion A.
2.2. Overview of task
All participants visited the lab approximately a week prior to
the scan and wrote a narrative account of their traumatic or most
distressing event, starting from just before they knew something
was wrong until the point where the event had resolved. Partici-
pants were prompted to include description of what they could
see, hear, touch smell, taste, and feel at each stage of the incident,
and also to describe their thoughts and emotions. For participants
who reported multiple distressing experiences the event was cho-
sen which bothered them most. At completion participants were
invited to highlight any sections of the narrative during the writing
of which they had experienced ﬂashbacks. Flashbacks were deﬁned
for participants in the following way: ‘‘A type of memory that you
experience as markedly different from those memories of an event
that you can retrieve at will. The difference might be a marked
sense of reliving of the traumatic experience(s). Some report com-
plete reliving, whereas others report more momentary or partial
reliving of perhaps just one aspect of the original experience. For
some, ﬂashback memories take them by surprise or swamp their
mind. Finally, some report a sense of time-distortion and, for
example, react to the ﬂashback memory as though it was an event
that was happening in the present’’. Only PTSD patients identiﬁed
ﬂashbacks. Numbers of ﬂashbacks were not counted separately.
Participants completed an autobiographical retrieval task, using
stimuli culled from the written narratives, whilst brain activity was
measured with fMRI. Participants were presented with items from
their own narrative (Own), interspersed with items from another
PTSD patient’s narrative thematically unrelated to their own
(Other), and were asked to identify Own items. This type of cue-
word task has previously been used in neuroimaging studies of
autobiographical retrieval (Maguire, 2001; Maguire & Frith, 2003;
Maguire & Mummery, 1999). For PTSD participants, Own items
were additionally either associated with ﬂashbacks they had of
events (Flashback), or were simply normal episodic memories of
the event (Episodic). Analyses were conducted to investigate suc-
cessful autobiographical retrieval (Own > Other) and activity spe-
ciﬁc to ﬂashbacks (OwnFlashback > OwnEpisodic).
2.3. Stimuli
Words (task 1) and phrases (task 2) were included to increase
the number of stimuli that could be used without directly repeat-
ing items, and to generate additional opportunities for ﬂashbacks
to occur. Words and phrases (typically 2–8 words long) were cho-
sen to be descriptive of key components of each narrative. Words
were matched to ‘master lists’ (see later) on variables of word fre-
quency and number of letters per word, and phrases was matched
on the variables of number of words and letters per sentence
(examples of master list items are given in supplementary materi-
als). Two ‘master lists’ were generated to serve as control stimuli.
One participant with PTSD had survived the July 2005 London
bombings, the other had survived the December 2004 Asian tsu-
nami. If a participant being tested had experienced one of these
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‘blood’ or ‘helpless’ were common to many narratives, and words
on the master list were substituted out on a case-by-case basis
whenever overlap was identiﬁed.
2.4. Test procedure
Stimuli were presented via a mirror mounted on the head coil of
the scanner, in direct view of the supine participant, at a distance
of approximately 50 cm from the projection screen. Participants
used an MR-compatible button-box in their right hand to respond
and were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possi-
ble. For both tasks the presentation of an item was preceded by an
asterisk () for 500 ms, followed by the item for (1000 ms in task 1,
1700 ms in task 2), followed by a ﬁxation cross for (2000 ms in task
1, and 2000 ms in task 2). These sequences of events gave SOAs for
tasks 1 and 2 of 3500 ms, and 4200 ms respectively. ‘Null events’
consisted of a ﬁxation cross presented for an entire SOA.
In task 1 72 Own words and 72 Other words from one of the
master lists were presented in the center of the screen in upper-
case Arial font. 72 null-events were included whereby a ﬁxation
cross was presented for an entire SOA. Task 2 was identical but
with a longer SOA to accommodate time for additional reading.
Sixty Own phrases were presented along with 60 Other phrases
in lowercase Arial font. After the scan PTSD participants were given
lists of all the stimuli they had seen during the test and were re-
quired to identify whether or not each item had led to the experi-
ence of a ﬂashback during the scan.
2.5. Data acquisition
MRI data were acquired on a 1.5 T whole body scanner (Magne-
tom Sonata, Siemens Medical, Erlangen, Germany) operated with
an 8-channel phased array receive coil and the standard body
transmit coil. The manufacturer’s standard automatic 3D-shim
procedure was performed at the beginning of each experiment.
The participants were scanned with a single-shot gradient-echo
EPI sequence sensitive to the blood-oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) effect using the following imaging parameters: 30 oblique
transverse slices, slice thickness = 2.5 mm, gap between sli-
ces = 1.25 mm, repetition time TR = 3 s, ﬂip angle a = 90o, echo
time TE = 50 ms, readout bandwidth BW = 2298 Hz/pixel, band-
width in PE direction BWPE = 31.3 Hz/pixel, phase-encoding (PE)
direction anterior–posterior, ﬁeld of view FOV = 192  192 mm2,
matrix size 64  64, fat suppression. BOLD sensitivity losses in
the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala due to susceptibility
artifacts were minimized by applying a z-shim gradient moment
of 0.8 mT/mms, a slice tilt of 30 and a positive PE gradient
polarity (Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs, & Deichmann, 2006). EPI mag-
nitude images were reconstructed from the complex k-space raw
data using a generalized reconstruction method based on the mea-
sured EPI k-space trajectory to minimize ghosting (Josephs, Deich-
mann, & Turner, 2000), combining the single coil images by sum of
squares (Roemer, Edelstein, Hayes, Souza, & Mueller, 1990). EPI
data acquisition was monitored on-line using a real-time recon-
struction and quality assurance system (Weiskopf et al., 2007).
Data were acquired during two separate sessions, with the ﬁrst ﬁve
volumes of each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration ef-
fects. A magnetic (B0) ﬁeld map image was collected before the
ﬁrst session and was used to unwarp the echo-planar images (Hut-
ton et al., 2002; Hutton, Deichmann, Turner, & Andersson, 2004).
Subjects were placed in a light head restraint within the scanner
to limit head movement during acquisition. A 3D MDEFT T1-
weighted structural image was also acquired following the func-
tional acquisition for superimposing statistical maps over anat-
omy. Whole-brain structural scans were acquired using aModiﬁed Driven Equilibrium Fourier Transform (MDEFT) sequence
(Ugurbil et al., 1993) with optimized parameters as described in
the literature (Deichmann, Schwarzbauer, & Turner, 2004). For
each volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions were acquired with an im-
age matrix of 256  224 (Read  Phase). Two-fold over-sampling
was performed in read direction (head/foot direction) to prevent
aliasing. The isotropic spatial resolution was 1 mm. Relevant imag-
ing parameters were: TR/TE/TI = 12.24 ms/3.56 ms/530 ms.
2.6. Data analysis
fMRI data were processed and analyzed using the statistical
software package SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,
London, UK. http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The ﬁrst 5 EPI vol-
umes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining
functional images from each subject were realigned using rigid-
body transformation to correct for head movements to the mean
functional image using 7th-degree B-spline interpolation, un-
warped, and coregistered to the anatomical T1-weighted MR image
using a normalized mutual information function. Next, structural
images were segmented and normalized into a common stereotac-
tic space (MNI 152 T1-template). Subsequently, the normalization
parameters were applied to the functional images and these were
resampled to 3  3  3-mm3 isotropic voxels 7th-degree B-spline
interpolation. Finally, spatial smoothing was applied with an iso-
tropic 3D Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width half-maximum.
Statistical analysis was performed in two stages of a mixed ef-
fects model. In the ﬁrst stage the neural activity was modeled by
a stick function (impulse event) at stimulus onset (task 1 – words)
or an epoch with a duration of 1.5 s (task 2 – phrases). The ensuing
BOLD response was modeled with a canonical haemodynamic re-
sponse function (HRF) (Friston et al., 1998). An AR(1) model was
used to estimate and correct for non-sphericity of the error covari-
ance (Friston et al., 2002). For each voxel, the image time-series
was high pass ﬁltered to 1/128 Hz.
The resulting general linear model (GLM) was used to obtain
parameter estimates representing the activity elicited by the
events of interest. Four event types were deﬁned, consisting of cor-
rect responses to ‘Own Flashback’ items, correct responses to ‘Own
Episodic’ item, correct rejections to ‘Other Flashback’ items, and
correct rejections to ‘Other Episodic’ items. For PTSD patients the
Flashback/Episodic distinction was made by combining pre- and
post-scan reports of which items were associated with ﬂashbacks.
Thus for this group any items which led to reports of a ﬂashback,
either during the narrative or while being scanned, were assigned
to the ‘own ﬂashback’ category. For control and depressed partici-
pants items were randomly assigned to ‘ﬂashback’ and ‘episodic’
categories in order to allow identical data analysis procedures. Par-
ticipants’ performance was high enough such that it was not pos-
sible to model misses. Also included for each session were six
covariates to capture residual movement-related artifacts (three ri-
gid-body translation, and three for rotation).
Contrasts for effects of interest were speciﬁed at the ﬁrst level,
and entered in to a full-factorial model at the second level. Run 1
(words) and run 2 (phrases) were included as separate sessions
within the second-level model, but to maximize power, and be-
cause we had no a-priori hypotheses requiring separate analyses,
all results presented here are reported for the combination of
words and sentences tasks. Based on an analysis of demographic
data covariates of no interest ‘length of time since trauma’, and
‘BDI’ were included in the model.
All effects were thresholded at p < 0.001 with an extent of k > 5
unless otherwise speciﬁed. Between-group effects were generated
by interrogating the model discussed above. Common effects (ef-
fects common to the PTSD, control and depressed groups) were ob-
tained by an inclusive mask of activity in each of the three groups,
Table 3
Common effects for Own > Other contrast. Inclusive mask of PTSD, Depressed, and
Control results. Each thresholded at p = 0.025 to produce combined threshold of
p = 0.001 (via Fisher’s procedure). BA indicates Brodmann area; MNI, Montreal
Neurological Institute.
Region BA Cluster size MNI coordinates
(x y z)
L Superior medial gyrus 9 281 0 33 33
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er’s procedure, of p < 0.001 (conjunction null) (Nichols, Brett,
Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005).
3. Results
3.1. Demographic and behavioral data
Patient demographics and scores on clinical measures are given
in Table 1. Groups did not differ according to age or the age at
which they left full-time education, but post hoc tests indicated
that the depressed group had experienced their index event signif-
icantly longer ago than the controls. BDI and BAI scores for the
PTSD and depressed groups did not differ, but both were signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the controls. Participants in the PTSD group
scored signiﬁcantly higher than controls on the PDS. Nine of the
depressed group, 3 of the PTSD group, and none of the control
group were taking antidepressant medication.
Memory performance is given in Table 2. Pr provides an unbi-
ased estimate of accuracy in the response to old and new items,
where higher values correspond to greater accuracy. Br is an index
of response bias, the tendency to respond ‘‘old’’ or ‘‘new’’ regard-
less of accuracy (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).
There was a main effect of task on Pr, F(1,36) = 283.42,
p < 0.001, but no main effect of group or task by group interaction.
Pr was signiﬁcantly higher for phrases (mean 0.79, SD 0.09) than
for words (mean 0.55, SD 0.12), t(38) = 16.77, p < 0.001. There
was also a main effect of task on Br, F(1,36) = 17.02, p < 0.001,
but no main effect of group or task by group interaction. Br was
signiﬁcantly higher for words (mean 0.47, SD 0.14) than for
phrases (mean 0.32, SD 0.22), t(38) = 4.366, p < 0.001. Response
bias for the words task was neutral but for the sentences task
was < 0.5, indicating a propensity for participants to respond
‘‘new’’. This pattern is driven by the very low rate of false alarms:
participants were very accurate in correctly rejecting phrases fromTable 1
Means (standard deviations) of demographic and clinical data by group.














































Different subscripts indicate signiﬁcant differences (p < .05).
* p < .05.
** p < .001.
Table 2
Memory accuracy (Pr and Br).
Memory accuracy PTSD Depressed Control
Words
Pr 0.514 (0.14) 0.590 (0.12) 0.525 (0.09)
Br 0.544 (0.13) 0.432 (0.16) 0.473 (0.12)
Phrases
Pr 0.793 (0.12) 0.809 (0.09) 0.777 (0.09)
Br 0.422 (0.22) 0.261 (0.22) 0.324 (0.22)another individual’s narrative but were more cautious identifying
phrases as being from their own narrative.
Patients in the PTSD group reported ﬂashbacks to an average of
50.4 out of a total of 264 individual stimuli. Of these, an average of
31.6 were to words or phrases that had been reported as eliciting a
ﬂashback during the narrative task, and an average of 15.5 were to
words or phrases that had not been reported as eliciting a ﬂash-
back during the narrative task. The remaining 3.3 ﬂashbacks were
to words or phrases from the control (Other) narrative. As the focus
of interest was the experience of a ﬂashback, all these items were
included in the analyses.
3.2. fMRI data
Analyses were ﬁrst directed at ﬁnding activity common to all
three groups during the successful retrieval of autobiographical
memories. Subsequent analyses aimed to delineate between-group
differences. Unless otherwise speciﬁed all contrasts reported here
include the variables ‘BDI’ and ‘time since trauma’ as covariates
of no interest. Effects common to all three groups for the Own > -
Other contrast (i.e. hits > correct rejections) are given in Table 3
and Fig. 1. There was signiﬁcant activity in the left middle, superior
medial, and superior frontal cortices. Bilateral posterior cingulate,
right caudate, left insula, left retrosplenial cortex, and left middle
temporal cortex also demonstrated activation. Minimal between-
group effects were observed for the Own > Other contrast. RelativeL PCC/Precuneus 23 11 3 45 36
L/R Posterior cingulate 23/31 82 0 39 39
L Superior frontal gyrus 10 10 33 57 0
R Caudate nucleus 56 9 9 3
L Insula 13 8 45 12 0
R Supramarginal gyrus 40 10 60 48 36
L Middle Frontal gyrus 10/46 26 39 45 6
L Retrosplenial cortex 26/29/30 6 3 45 9
L Middle Temporal gyrus 21 8 54 33 3
Fig. 1. Effects common to all three groups for the Own > Other contrast. Results
thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 5.
Table 4
Regions demonstrating increased activation for the OwnFlashback > OwnEpisodic
contrast in the PTSD group only. Thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 5. No covariates were
included in this analysis. BA indicates Brodmann area; MNI, Montreal Neurological
Institute.
Region BA Cluster size MNI coordinates
(x y z)
Z-score
L Anterior cingulate 24 43 3 27 30 4.17
R SMA 6 20 18 9 48 4.08
L Precentral 6 58 45 9 42 3.93
L Middle occipital 35 21 78 12 3.79
R Insula 13/14 7 27 21 12 3.72
L Supramarginal 40 17 54 39 33 3.58
L Insula 13/14 8 42 3 0 3.56
R Precentral 12 48 15 42 3.53
R Superior medial PFC 10 5 6 57 12 3.49
R Supramarginal 21 63 27 42 3.39
L Precentral 5 57 3 27 3.29
Fig. 2. Flashback-speciﬁc activity in the PTSD gr
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increased activity in a 5-voxel region of the right mid-cingulate
cortex (x = 9, y = 9, z = 45), and decreased activity in an 8-voxel re-
gion of the right inferior frontal gyrus (x = 45, y = 33, z = 3).
We next examined activity associated with the OwnFlash-
back > OwnEpisodic contrast. There were no effects common to
all three groups. Table 4 and Fig. 2 report activations associated
with ﬂashbacks versus episodic memories in the PTSD group only.
Flashback-associated increases in activations were evident in left
anterior cingulate (ACC) and middle occipital cortices, right sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) and medial prefrontal cortex, and
bilaterally in precentral areas, inferior parietal (supramarginal)
cortices, and the insula.
We further investigated regions demonstrating ﬂashback-asso-
ciated increases or decreases in the PTSD group relative to the con-
trol and depressed groups. These are given in Table 5 and Fig. 3.
Parameter estimates for each group are given in Fig. 4. There wasoup. Results thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 5.
Table 5
Regions demonstrating increased or decreased ﬂashback-associated activity in the
PTSD group relative to the control and depressed groups. Thresholded at p < 0.001,
k > 5. These results include ‘length of time since trauma’ and ‘BDI’ as covariates of no







PTSD > (Depressed + Control)
R Insula 13/
14
6 24 21 15 4.26
L Middle occipital gyrus 18 24 81 15 3.85
L Precentral gyrus 6 11 42 9 45 3.67
R supplementary motor
area (SMA)
6 5 21 6 42 3.36
(Depressed + Control) > PTSD
Midbrain – red nucleus 8 3 21 9 3.63
L Parahippocampal gyrus 36/
37
6 27 36 15 3.43
R Precuneus/PCC 31 11 3 57 24 3.37
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showing signiﬁcantly greater ﬂashback-speciﬁc activity in regions
of the right SMA, left middle occipital gyrus and precentral cortex,
and right insula. In addition PTSD patients showed reduced ﬂash-
back-speciﬁc activity in the midbrain/red nucleus, left fusiform/
parahippocampal gyrus, and right precuneus/PCC.Fig. 3. Flashback-speciﬁc between-groups differences. Results thresholded at
p < 0.001, k > 5.4. Discussion
Behavioral results indicated that participants in all groups were
able to identify their own autobiographical events with a high de-
gree of accuracy. This contrasts with evidence for an overall deﬁcit
in PTSD in learning neutral material (Brewin, Kleiner, Vasterling, &
Field, 2007). Separate analyses not reported here showed that the
occurrence of ﬂashbacks was in general associated with greater
accuracy, but on those rare occasions when they occurred to stim-
uli from another person’s narrative those stimuli were likely to be
falsely recognized as belonging to their own narrative (Brewin,
Huntley, & Whalley, 2012).
Neural effects common to all three groups during the successful
retrieval of autobiographical memories were observed in several
prefrontal areas as well as the posterior cingulate, precuneus,
and retrosplenial cortex, regions identiﬁed as primary areas of
the autobiographical memory system (Gilboa, 2004; Svoboda
et al., 2006). As in previous studies of emotional memory (Cabeza
& St. Jacques, 2007; Svoboda et al., 2006), insula activity was also
common to all groups. Between-group differences for the Own >
Other contrast were much more limited. Relative to the other
groups PTSD patients showed increased activity in the right mid-
cingulate cortex, and reduced activity in the right inferior frontal
cortex. This limited pattern of differential activity is consistent
with previous work (Gilboa et al., 2004; Whalley, Rugg, Smith,
Dolan, & Brewin, 2009) in suggesting a substantially intact neural
system supporting episodic retrieval.
As predicted, given the absence of ﬂashbacks reported by de-
pressed patients and controls, there were no effects common to
all three groups for the OwnFlashback > OwnEpisodic contrast. Rel-
ative to the depressed and control groups, PTSD participants exhib-
ited ﬂashback-speciﬁc increases in the right insula, left mid-
occipital cortex, left precentral cortex, and right SMA, and de-
creases in the midbrain (red nucleus), the left parahippocampal
gyrus, and the right precuneus. These results were broadly consis-
tent with the hypotheses: As well as increases in the insula and
mid-occipital areas, corresponding to the affective and visual com-
ponents of S-reps predicted by dual representation theory, changesin activation were observed in a number of recognized pathways
emerging from the dorsal visual stream.
The dorsal visual stream has two parallel projections to dorsal
and ventral regions of premotor cortex (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, &
Mishkin, 2011), which are believed to mediate eye movements,
reaching, and grasping, among other forms of visually guided ac-
tion that may be required for defensive purposes. These pathways
could account for the observed activations in SMA and precentral
areas, which are also consistent with previous studies of PTSD (Gil-
boa et al., 2004). A connectivity analysis (Vogt, Vogt, & Laureys,
2006) has also linked body orientation in space to a network that
includes the SMA and precentral gyrus.
The results were also consistent with the prediction that in-
tense ﬂashback-type memories would be associated with a de-
crease in activity in areas such as middle and inferior temporal
cortex, associated with allocentric spatial representations. In addi-
tion to decreased activity in the parahippocampus, a ventral visual
stream region involved in allocentric scene information (Burgess,
Becker, King, & O’Keefe, 2001), we found reduced activation in an
area including the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus.
The PCC is involved in the conversion of egocentric to allocentric
representations, essentially contextualising a sensory
representation.
The precuneus is a complex area subserving a number of differ-
ent functions. Whereas the anterior precuneus is mainly connected
Fig. 4. Parameter estimates extracted from the peak voxel of each of the key regions identiﬁed in the between-subjects ﬂashbacks analysis. Error bars show 95% conﬁdence
interval.
M.G. Whalley et al. / Brain and Cognition 81 (2013) 151–159 157to sensorimotor areas, also including a projection to the insula, the
central precuneus is viewed as a cognitive/association area (Mar-
gulies et al., 2009). It has been argued that the precuneus is part
of an important network subserving consciousness, and that dur-
ing aversive sensations there may be efforts to terminate self-
reﬂection, resulting in decreased processing in the precuneus (Vogt
& Laureys, 2005). Flashbacks are certainly experienced as aversive
by PTSD patients, as indicated by the fact that avoidance of invol-
untary trauma memories forms part of the diagnostic criteria, and
our results are consistent with this process. Alternatively, reduced
precuneus activation may be connected with the involuntary nat-
ure of memory retrieval (Hall, Gjedde, & Kupers, 2008).
The red nucleus has been shown to be part of an extended func-
tional network that includes associative prefrontal, parietal, occip-
ital, temporal, and limbic areas, but not sensorimotor cortex
(Nioche, Cabanis, & Habas, 2009). Nioche et al. argue that its wide-
spread connectivity points towards a cognitive role, possibly re-
lated to salience detection or executive control. An activity
decrease here during overwhelming ﬂashback experiences could
indicate a disruption to normal executive processes, or might re-
ﬂect disrupted patterns of input and output to and from other
ﬂashback-affected areas.
Analyses of ﬂashbacks within the PTSD group alone found addi-
tional evidence for greater activation of motor cortex and other
closely connected regions involved in response selection such as
dorsal ACC (dACC). This is of particular interest as dorsal ACC is
thought to modulate fear expression in humans (Milad et al.,
2007). There is evidence for hyperresponsivity in some areas of
dACC being a familial risk factor for PTSD (Shin et al., 2011).
Analyses of ﬂashbacks in the PTSD group revealed bilateral acti-
vation in the supramarginal gyrus. This forms part of the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), an area involved in self-location and ﬁrst-
person perspective (Ionta et al., 2011). Consistent with predictions
from dual representation theory, right-lateralized activation in the
same area we identiﬁed in this study may be associated with the
ability to represent or act on objects from an egocentric perspec-
tive (Maguire et al., 1998).Within the memory literature this inferior parietal area is also
hypothesized to be involved in the capture of attention bottom-
up by behaviorally-relevant stimuli (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, &
Moscovitch, 2008) Cabeza et al.’s Attention to Memory model spe-
ciﬁcally hypothesized that not just external stimuli but also inter-
nal stimuli such as salient memories could activate this area, and
speciﬁcally suggested activation as a result of involuntary remem-
bering. Subsequent analyses have shown greater connectivity be-
tween the supramarginal gyrus and occipital areas when a
salient perceptual stimulus is detected, but greater connectivity
with the MTL when a salient memory is detected (Cabeza et al.,
2011). Flashbacks are perhaps the most extreme example of atten-
tionally-salient involuntary remembering, including very marked
perceptual features, and so provide an excellent test of this
hypothesis. Together with recent work on the consequences of
failed attempts at memory suppression (Levy, Huddleston, &
Anderson, 2011), our ﬁndings are among the ﬁrst to conﬁrm Cabe-
za et al.’s prediction. Ventral parietal activations tend to be left-
sided when recalling episodic memories and right-lateralized for
perceptual stimuli but many perceptual studies ﬁnd bilateral acti-
vations consistent with our data.
The neural activity distinguishing the OwnFlashback > OwnEpi-
sodic contrast in PTSD patients has some striking similarities with
other areas of the memory literature, for example with the neural
correlates of recollection and familiarity (Dörfel, Werner, Schaefer,
von Kummer, & Karl, 2009). These authors identiﬁed precuneus
activity that was common to recollection and familiarity, but found
that it was lower for familiarity than for recollection. They also re-
ported that hippocampal and parahippocampal activation was
associated with recollection but not familiarity, whereas supple-
mentary motor area activity was more strongly associated with
familiarity than with recollection. This suggests there may be some
connection between the experience of a ﬂashback and a familiarity
judgement.
Memory studies using healthy controls and stimuli of low to
average personal signiﬁcance have found that recollection of the
learning event, accompanied by its contextual detail, is normally
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line region, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior parietal cortex
contribute to a separate network related to decisions concerning
retrieval success (Henson, Hornberger, & Rugg, 2005; Huijbers,
Pennartz, & Daselaar, 2010; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner,
2005). Although it is unclear whether activity in these regions re-
ﬂects episodic long-term memory or simply retrieval conﬁdence,
it has been suggested that they could support judgments that a re-
trieval cue was familiar in the absence of actual recollection. For
example, the mnemonic accumulator hypothesis (Wagner et al.,
2005) proposed that areas in posterior parietal cortex integrate
and accumulate available mnemonic evidence relevant to deci-
sions about whether a cue is old versus new.
It is natural to assume that very intensely experienced memo-
ries such as ﬂashbacks would exemplify a particularly strong form
of recollection, particularly since in the average laboratory study
familiarity judgments are usually made in the absence of any
remembered detail. Recent evidence indicates, however, that in
some instances familiarity judgements may also be very strong (In-
gram, Mickes, & Wixted, 2012). Posttraumatic stress disorder is
characterized by images that, although lacking in spatial and tem-
poral context, are richly detailed and persistent, and accompanied
by autonomic and body state elements. Such images could simi-
larly have the potential to provide strong mnemonic evidence that
a traumatic event has occurred. It is possible that when such
images are retrieved they are treated like the cues presented in
standard recognition studies, only eliciting a decision about their
familiarity rather than any further elaboration and recollection.
As already noted, a cardinal symptom of PTSD is avoidance of
thoughts and memories concerning the trauma, which suggests
that elaboration of a very negative memory would be aversive. This
tendency toward avoidance, which may be illustrated in PTSD by
the ﬁnding of a negative inﬂuence of prefrontal cortex on visual
areas such as the precuneus in response to trauma reminders (Gil-
boa et al., 2004), is speciﬁcally counteracted in trauma-focused
cognitive–behavior therapy (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
We propose therefore that successful identiﬁcation of ﬂash-
backs is based on a strong feeling of familiarity. Full recollection
is not required because the detailed sensory dorsal-stream repre-
sentations enable the individual to identify the images rapidly
and with great conﬁdence without further memory search. It
should be noted, however, that the stimuli in our study were pre-
sented more brieﬂy than in the average autobiographical memory
investigation, and this provides a possible alternative explanation
for the failure to observe classic markers of recollection in the neu-
ral response to ﬂashbacks.
This preliminary study was subject to a number of signiﬁcant
limitations. Participants had experienced a heterogeneous mix of
trauma exposure, there was a wide range of time elapsed since
the trauma, and they included a mix of medicated and unmedi-
cated patients. Although it has been argued that neuroimaging
studies should include medicated and unmedicated patients in or-
der to reﬂect the general PTSD population (Lanius et al., 2010), not
enough is known about potential interactions of drug and task.
There were insufﬁcient numbers in this study to examine drug ef-
fects statistically. There was also signiﬁcant comorbidity in our pa-
tient sample, with high levels of depressive symptoms, although
our use of a separate depressed group as well as the inclusion of
depression as a covariate attempted to control for this.
Not all PTSD participants had ﬂashbacks in the scanner. Limiting
our analyses purely to items which were associated with in-scan-
ner ﬂashbacks would have been desirable but there were insufﬁ-
cient data. Our ‘ﬂashback’ category was therefore an amalgam of
items which led to ﬂashbacks during the writing of the narrative
and items which caused a ﬂashback in the scanner (generally an
Own but occasionally an Other item). Conﬁrmation of our ﬁndingsmust await replication with a larger sample that can offer more
statistical power. Finally, we did not gather data about how partic-
ipants were responding to ﬂashbacks. There is a considerable liter-
ature examining attempts to suppress or reappraise emotional
memories which could be applied to this question.5. Conclusions
Our results conﬁrm that the episodic memory system in PTSD is
likely intact, and provide some preliminary evidence that ﬂash-
backs may be associated with increases in activity in areas associ-
ated with the dorsal visual stream, coupled with decreases in
ventral stream activity. Our data also support previous indications
that PTSD patients can discriminate the occurrence of ﬂashbacks
during written narratives (Hellawell & Brewin, 2002, 2004). Con-
sistent with the fact that the parts of narratives that involve ﬂash-
backs contain more motion words (Hellawell & Brewin, 2004), the
increased activations in numerous areas of motor cortex suggest
that ﬂashbacks are a form of memory that facilitates action on
the environment (such as ﬁght or ﬂight).
The data may also have a bearing on the controversy concerning
dual-process models of recognition memory. Although compari-
sons of recollection and familiarity are often confounded with
strong and weak memories respectively (Squire, Wixted, & Clark,
2007; Wixted, 2007), these two processes may nevertheless have
separate neural substrates (Dörfel et al., 2009; Rugg & Yonelinas,
2003; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005). Our ﬁndings suggest
that even intense autobiographical memories, experienced with
extreme clarity and vividness, may sometimes demonstrate a neu-
ral signature that more closely resembles familiarity than
recollection.6. Funding
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